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ABSTRACT
Any discussion of flaws in the United States patent system
inevitably turns to the system’s modern villain: non-practicing
entities, known more colorfully as patent trolls. For many years,
however, discussions about non-practicing entities have been
long on speculation and short on data.
In 2011 Congress directed the nonpartisan Government
Accountability Office to study the effects of non-practicing
entities on patent litigation. At the request of the GAO, we
collected and coded a set of patent lawsuits filed over the past
five years. This article presents our analysis of the data and its
implications.
The data confirm in a dramatic fashion what many scholars
and commentators have suspected: patent monetization entities
play a role in a substantial portion of the lawsuits filed today.
Based on our sample, lawsuits filed by patent monetizers have
increased from 22% of the cases filed five years ago to almost
40% of the cases filed in the most recent year. In addition, of the
five parties in the sample who filed the greatest number of
lawsuits during the period studied, four were monetizers and
only one was an operating company.
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INTRODUCTION
Any discussion of flaws in the United States patent system
inevitably turns to the system’s modern villain: non-practicing entities.1
They are known more colorfully as patent trolls, although the business
model of non-practicing entities has appeared in copyright markets as
well as well as in patent markets.2 These entities have affected a long list
of industries, including computer hardware, smartphones, electronics,
information technology, pharmaceuticals, construction, manufacturing,
hospitality and many more.3
1

James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes 3
(Boston Univ. School of Law, Working Paper No. 12-34, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2091210 (“NPEs provide a
way for these inventors to earn rents that they might not otherwise realize, thus
providing them with greater incentives to innovate.”); Christopher A. Cotropia,
The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 52, 62 (2009–10) (“[P]atentees who are non-producing and engage in
hold-up behavior have been labeled ‘patent trolls.’”); Jason Rantanen, Slaying
the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 164 (2006) (describing patent trolls
as “acquir[ing] patents for the sole purpose of using them to obtain a revenue
stream from a firm that engages in activities arguably falling within the scope of
the patent”); Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build a PIT to
Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 367 (2005) (using the
definition given by the assistant general counsel for Intel, Peter Detkin:
“[S]omebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not
practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never
practiced”); Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software
Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1024 (2005) (“Essentially, trolls are serving a
function as intermediaries that specialize in litigation to exploit the value of
patents that cannot be exploited effectively by those that have originally
obtained them. That is not in and of itself a bad thing.”).
2
See James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass
Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
79, 86 (2012) (defining copyright trolls); see also Robin Feldman, Intellectual
Property Wrongs 42–50 (Aug. 10, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2127558
(providing
examples of copyright trolling).
3
Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1, 14 (discussing suits by non-practicing entities against many companies
including Kodak, Hewlett Packard, Samsung, Facebook, YouTube, LinkedIn,
and cable providers); Christopher T. Vrountas et al., Patent Trolls Who, What,
Where & How to Defend Against Them, 52 N.H. B.J., Autumn 2011, at 40, 41
(2011) (discussing troll activity in the hospitality industry); Colleen V. Chien,
From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its
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Numerous variations on the theme exist. For example, in recent
years we have seen the emergence of patent mass aggregators, who may
acquire thousands or even tens of thousands of patents.4 In some cases,
companies that make products have developed their own versions of nonpracticing entities, spinning their patent portfolios off into separate
entities or transferring selected patents to outside entities that will assert
those rights.5
For many years, discussions about non-practicing entities have
featured ample speculation, but lacked empirical data. Recently,
however, a few fascinating studies have presented hard data on nonpracticing entities, offering some tantalizing glimpses into their practices
as well as their effects on patent litigation and the patent system more
broadly. We will discuss these briefly in Part 1 of this article.
Congress waded into the topic of non-practicing entities in the
2011 patent reform act, known as the “America Invents Act.”6 In the
debate leading up to the Act, various members of Congress expressed
their displeasure over non-practicing entities. For example, one
Congressman railed against individuals who “do not produce anything
but lie in wait” to demand money from others.7 Another complained that
patent trolls have “vacuum[ed]” patents by the hundreds or thousands
and that their only innovation occurs in the courtroom.8

Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 327–332 (2010–
2011) (discussing various classes of entities that assert patents in the high tech
industry); Mann, supra note 1, at 1023–25 (discussing troll activity in the
software industry);
4
Ewing & Feldman, supra note 3, at 15–18 (discussing the scope of some mass
aggregator activities).
5
See id. at 85–86 (describing creation of the Round Rock aggregator by a
transfer of 20% of Micron’s patent assets); Ashby Jones, Patent “Troll” Tactics
Spread, WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 8, 2012, 8:46 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023032922045775147829323909
96.html.
6
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
7
157 CONG. REC. H4431 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Congressman
Bob Goodlatte).
8
157 CONG. REC. H4486, (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Congressman
Lamar Smith); see also id. at 4496 (statement of Congressman Michael Grimm)
(arguing that patent trolls have made business-method patents their specialty and
have attempted to influence legislation so that they can continue to exploit their
low-quality patents).
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The America Invents Act contained a provision directly aimed at
non-practicing entities. Prior to passage of the Act, some jurisdictions
had allowed patent holders to proceed against numerous companies in
one action on the grounds that deciding the scope of the patent was a
sufficient basis to join the parties, even if their acts of infringement were
unrelated.9 The Act overruled this interpretation, requiring instead that
infringement must arise out of the same occurrence or transaction and
involve questions of common fact in order to permit joinder.10 The
change was intended to disrupt the non-practicing entity’s tactic of
joining large numbers of disparately located defendants in one lawsuit
and forcing the defendants to litigate in the non-practicing entity’s
chosen forum.11
In another provision of the America Invents Act, Congress
directed the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office (GAO) to
conduct a study “on the consequences of patent infringement lawsuits
brought by non-practicing entities.”12 At the GAO’s request, the authors
provided data on non-practicing entities over a five-year period (20072011) using a database from Lex Machina, formerly the Stanford IP
Clearinghouse. The GAO requested only the coded data without
analysis, and we provided this with the understanding that we would
publish our own analysis of the data at a later time. This article presents
our analysis. We note that although the cases were compiled at the

9

See, e.g., MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455, 456–57; see also
Jared Bobrow, The New World of Patent Litigation Under The America Invents
Act, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, June 2012, at 15 (“Before the
enactment . . . some patent owners were filing suits in which they named 20, 30,
40 or even more defendants in the same lawsuit.”).
10
35 U.S.C. § 299(b) (2011) (“[A]ccused infringers may not be joined in one
action as defendants or counterclaim defendants, or have their actions
consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations that they each have infringed
the patent or patents in suit.”); 157 CONG. REC. S5429 (daily ed. Sep. 8, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (“This new section bars joinder of accused
infringers as codefendants, or consolidation of their cases for trial, if the only
common fact and transaction among the defendants is that they are alleged to
have infringed the same patent. This provision effectively codifies current law as
it has been applied everywhere outside of the Eastern District of Texas.” (citing
Rudd v. Lux Prods. Corp., 2011 WL 148052 (N.D. Ill. January 12, 2011)).
11
Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting
Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 673, 675–76 (2012) (discussing the effects of
the AIA’s provision on joinder).
12
157 CONG. REC. S5441 (daily ed. September 8, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Patrick Leahy).

No. 2]

THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT 500

361

GAO’s request, all conclusions are those of the authors alone and not
those of the GAO.
As an initial matter, the authors chose to use the term “patent
monetization entity,” to describe those entities whose primary focus is
deriving income from licensing and litigation, as opposed to making
products. We will explain below the way in which we believe our new
terminology creates a better definitional grouping than terms employed
in the past. In addition to the term “patent monetization entity,” we also
use the word “monetizer” as a short form.
Chief among the conclusions of the study are the following:
First, based on our sample, lawsuits filed by patent monetizers have
increased significantly over the five-year period. The sheer number of
cases has increased, as well as the percentage of overall case filings
represented by monetizers. In other words, lawsuits filed by patent
monetizers are on the rise, while lawsuits filed by operating companies
have fallen.13
Specifically, lawsuits filed by monetizers increased from 22% of
the cases filed five years ago to almost 40% of the cases filed in the most
recent year. In addition, monetizers were also heavily represented in the
list of those who filed the greatest number of lawsuits. Of the 5 parties in
the sample who filed the greatest number of lawsuits during the period
studied, 4 were monetizers and only one was an operating company.
Of additional note, universities were almost invisible in this
dataset, despite sometimes being grouped with non-practicing entities on
the theory that they do not make products. Universities accounted for
only 0.2% of the first-named plaintiffs who filed lawsuits in our sample.
The number rises slightly when second-named plaintiffs are included, but
remains quite small.14
The data also show that cases filed by patent monetizers were
unlikely to advance very far in the trial process and often settled prior to
a summary judgment decision. The following sections will detail these
and other results of the study.
The data confirm in a dramatic fashion what many scholars and
commentators have suspected: Patent monetization entities play a role in
13
14

See infra text accompanying notes 43–58.
See infra text accompanying note 61.
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a substantial portion of the lawsuits filed today. The results are even
more striking, given that the study examined only disputes that
progressed to the courtroom. From all appearances, lawsuits filed are
only the tip of the iceberg, and a major operating company may face
hundreds of invitations to license for every lawsuit.15 Much of the
bargaining, posturing, and payment concludes without any party filing
suit. Thus, the findings likely understate the true impact of patent
monetization entities on the patent system, and on the economy, as a
whole.

I. PRIOR LITERATURE
Although prior literature on patent monetization entities has been
largely based on anecdotal evidence and projection, a few studies have
illuminated portions of the landscape, and empirical work has increased
over time. For example, James Bessen and Michael Meurer published
one of the earliest data-based analyses in their 2008 book, Patent
Failure.16 Bessen and Meurer defined patent trolls to include only
individual inventors who do not commercialize or manufacture their
inventions.17 Thus, the authors did not consider groups, aggregators, or
other types of entities. Looking only at individuals, the authors
concluded that troll behavior did not have much impact on patent
litigation costs.18
In 2010, Colleen Chien published a study showing substantially
stronger participation by monetizers. Using a broader definition of what
constitutes a patent troll, Chien found that the share of all high-tech
patent suits brought by non-practicing entities amounted to 20 percent.19
Both Chien’s broader definition of patent troll and her focus on the high15

See generally ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 50–74 (2012)
(describing bargaining in modern patents).
16
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 16 (2008) (arguing
that outside the pharmaceutical and chemistry industries, the costs of litigating
patents outweigh the earnings gained from patents, and the divide between the
two is growing). The authors note that the data “understates the extent to which
costs exceeded benefits for several reasons: disputes settled before a lawsuit was
filed are not counted, nor are foreign disputes; this comparison ignores the costs
of obtaining patents and clearance; and for a variety of reasons, the estimates of
worldwide patent profits are biased upwards, while the estimates of litigation
costs are biased downwards.” Id.
17
Id. at 17.
18
Id. at 16–17.
19
Chien, supra note 3, at 334 (discussing the fallacy of defensive patenting).
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tech industry may have contributed to the results indicating a greater
impact. The difference may also reflect the fact that Chien’s data covers
years more recent than those in the Bessen and Meurer data.20 Our own
study will show that lawsuits from patent monetizers have been rising at
a significant pace in recent years.21
Additional studies, a number of them published this year, have
cast light on various aspects of patent monetization. For example,
Allison, Tiller, Zyontz, and Bligh focused on a comparison of Internetrelated patents to non-Internet-related patents.22 The authors found that in
the software industry, Internet-related patents were litigated 7.5 to 9.5
times more frequently than non-Internet patents.23 The study also noted
that once a lawsuit has been filed, the owners of Internet-related patents
were more likely to settle before judgment than owners of non-Internetrelated patents.24 Other scholars have focused on the costs that nonpracticing entity litigation imposes on the patent system as a whole.25
20

In particular, Chien studied data after the turn of the millennium while Bessen
and Meurer studied data from 1984 to 1999. Compare id. at 335, with Bessen &
Meurer, supra note 16, at Figure 1.1 (2008) (showing aggregate profits from
patents and aggregate litigation costs from 1984 to 1999). See generally Bessen
& Meurer, supra note 16, at Figure 1.1.
21
Patent Freedom, a group providing subscription-based information service on
NPEs for large operating companies, also concluded that non-practicing entity
litigation has risen in recent years. The group’s website displays a graph and a
short paragraph description. See All About NPEs, PATENTFREEDOM,
https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/litigations/ (last visited Nov. 26,
2012).
22
John R Allison et al., Patent Litigation and the Internet, 2012 Stan. Tech. L.
Rev. 1, 6 (2012) (discussing the difference in the rate of litigation between
Internet-related patents and non-Internet related patents).
23
Id. Cf. Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could
A Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators? 28–29
(Working Paper, 2012) (analyzing 100,000 patents issued from 1993 to 1994
and concluding that NPEs file more than twice as many suits per patent, assert
each patent against more than four times as many alleged infringers, and on
average assert patents closer to the expiration of the patent than product
companies).
24
Allison et al., supra note 23, at 6.
25
See generally Bessen & Meurer, supra note 2. The Bessen Meurer study itself
is based on a database developed by RPX, a patent aggregator, as well as a small
survey the aggregator conducted of entities with which it has a relationship. Id.
at 7. See also James Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private
and Social Costs of Patent Trolls 2 (Boston Univ. School of Law, Working
Paper No. 11-45, 2011) (“[T]he loss of billions of dollars associated with [NPE]
lawsuits harms society.”); cf. David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the

364

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

[Vol. 11

II. THE AIA 500: METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
The patent reform legislation known as the America Invents Act
was signed into law in September 2011. The Act directs the Government
Accountability Office, the nonpartisan investigative arm of Congress, to
conduct a study on the consequences of patent infringement lawsuits
brought by non-practicing entities.26 To support its investigation, the
Government Accountability Office requested that Lex Machina provide
data on non-practicing entities for the five years between 2007 and 2011.
Lex Machina co-authors Sara Jeruss and Joshua Walker joined Professor
Robin Feldman of UC Hastings Law to collect and analyze the data.
The GAO requested that we produce a random sample consisting
of 100 of the patent infringement cases filed each year for a period of
five years. We were asked to code the 500 cases to establish the types of
entities involved in each of the lawsuits, as well as to examine additional
details of the suits. The Agency requested that we deliver the coded data
to them without analysis, and we provided the data with the
understanding that we would publish our own analysis at a later time. We
note that we were able to find sufficient information to classify 99
percent of the parties who filed infringement lawsuits in our sample.
The 500 cases were randomly selected from the Lex Machina
database. Lex Machina is a spin-off of the Stanford IP Litigation
Clearinghouse, which comprehensively mapped material patent litigation

Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System 3 (Chicago-Kent Coll. of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-13, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2117421 (arguing that the
$29 billion estimate “of the direct cost of NPE patent assertions should be
viewed as the highest possible limit”); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley &
Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants,
99 GEO. L.J. 677, 687 (2010) (finding that “most-litigated patent plaintiffs won
only 10.7% of their cases, compared with 26% across all lawsuits and 47.3% in
the once-litigated set”). Also, Allison, Lemley and Walker showed that product
producers were responsible for 79.2% of once litigated patent suits, but 36.5%
of the most litigated patents. Id. at 692. Finally, Allison, Lemley and Walker
found that software patents accounted for 93.7% of assertions of the most
litigated patents, id. at 696, and performed regression analysis to demonstrate an
inverse relationship between the number of defendants and the likelihood of
settlement. Id. at 699.
26
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §34, 125 Stat. 284
(2011).
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events and outcomes.27 Lex Machina continues this project by crawling
the web each day and extracting data and documents from PACER (the
administrative database of the United States federal courts), all 94 United
States District Court websites, the International Trade Commission’s
EDIS website, and the Patent & Trademark Office’s website.
To ensure that we would have 500 cases and be able to exclude
cases that did not meet our criteria, we used the Lex Machina database to
compile a randomly sampled set of 150-200 cases per year for 20072011, and then excluded cases until we were left with a usable set of 100
per year, for a total of 500 cases. Given our focus on patent holders who
file infringement cases, we chose to exclude declaratory judgment cases.
Declaratory judgment cases are filed by parties who have sufficient
reason to believe they will be sued for patent infringement and therefore
file an anticipatory suit to challenge the validity of the patent with which
they are being threatened.
We also excluded cases where information about the asserted
patents was not available electronically. Although PACER has improved
dramatically over the past few years, it does not have complaints for
some cases from the earlier years in our sample. To deal with this
problem, we excluded these cases and focused instead on randomly
sampled cases that do have records available on PACER. These cases
represent a small subset of the sample, primarily from 2007.28
We then classified the parties who filed the infringement
lawsuits in our sample. The data analysis focuses on the first person
named in the record as filing the infringement claim, although we
classified all of the parties filing. We chose to focus only on the first
named plaintiff because we rarely found one type of entity filing suit
jointly with entities of another type. Including secondary plaintiffs under
these circumstances would have skewed the data. For example, large
corporations often have several subsidiaries and affiliated entities that are
included as plaintiffs—Takeda Pharmaceuticals might file a complaint as
Takeda Pharmaceuticals Limited, Takeda Pharmaceuticals North
America, Takeda Pharmaceuticals LLC, and Takeda Pharmaceuticals
27

For additional information on Lex Machina and its database, see LEX
MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2012).
28
Excluding this subset does not influence the study, as cases from 2007 without
complaints occurred randomly (i.e. there is no systematic reason why all such
PACER cases lack an electronically available complaint). In addition, we
applied this exclusion uniformly and were left with 100 randomly sampled,
representative cases for each year.
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America, Inc. Similarly, we saw several cases of pharmaceutical
corporations joining together for ANDA cases, including AstraZenica
Pharmaceuticals, IPR Pharmaceuticals Inc., and Shionogi Seiyaku
Kabushiki Kaisha Corp. In contrast, most of the monetizers we saw were
lone entities. Including secondary named plaintiffs would thus have
overrepresented operating companies in the sample. We did encounter a
few cases in which an individual sued along with the individual’s
company, which were classified as “individual or trust.” We were
satisfied with that classification, given that these cases generally
involved shell companies that appeared to have been formed by the
inventor for the purposes of monetization.
Using court filings, SEC filings, company websites, and other
publicly available information, we assigned each of the parties filing the
cases to one of the nine types described in the paragraphs below. We also
identified the venue for each case, the defendants’ primary industry, the
outcome, and other information for each case. As noted above, we were
able to track down sufficient evidence to classify the parties for 99
percent of the cases in our sample.

A. What’s in a Name?
There has been considerable variation among the terms used in
the “patent troll” literature and debate, as well as the definition of those
terms. More neutral than the word “troll,” the term “non-practicing
entity” has been used to refer generally to those who do not manufacture
a product. The patent world, which has its own code-like lingo,29 would
say that these parties do not actually “practice” the patent that they own.
There also has been considerable disagreement about the type of
entity to include in the category of “non-practicing entity.” For example,
many commentators have noted that universities generally do not
commercialize the inventions developed in their labs. Technically, this
makes them non-practicing entities. Should we put universities in the
same basket as garden-variety trolls? “Non-practicing entity” is also a
somewhat awkward term to use when referring to an individual who uses
a patent to create a monetary stream, rather than making a product. How
can one refer to an individual as an “entity”?

29

See Robin Feldman, Plain Language Patents, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 289,
292 (describing the arcane code in which patents are written) (2009).

No. 2]

THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT 500

367

For an additional problem with classifying entities, consider the
patent aggregator RPX. RPX buys patents, creates licenses for its
members, and then transfers these patents to third parties, subject to the
licenses. In other words, the third parties who buy RPX’s patents are free
to assert the patents against anyone other than the RPX members.
The RPX model includes buying patents from troublesome trolls
on behalf of its members or for the benefit of its members. On its
website, the company describes its business as helping corporations
manage their exposure to patent litigation through activities that include
defensive buying and acquisition syndication.30 The company also
pledges that it will never assert or litigate the patents in its portfolio.31 In
other words, the company markets itself as a troll solution.
How should one characterize an aggregator such as RPX? Does
it matter that the company does not commercialize any of the patents that
pass through its hands?
The RPX configuration also highlights difficulties with a term
that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) introduced in a report last
year—“patent assertion entity” or “PAE” for short. The FTC described a
PAE as having a business model focused on “purchasing and asserting
patents against manufacturers already using the technology, rather than
developing and transferring the technology.”32 It is unclear from the
report what the FTC means when it refers to those “transferring the
technology.”
This highlights a problem that the FTC is likely to encounter in
choosing a term that focuses only on “patent assertion.” The patent
market today is characterized by complex and convoluted strategic
games.33 In these multi-dimensional battles, entities sometimes use thirdparty actors to accomplish their ends.34 Thus, in this environment, one
30

RPX, http://www.rpxcorp.com (last visited Oct. 13, 2012).
Id.
32
FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 (2011), available at
www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf [hereinafter Evolving IP
Marketplace].
33
See generally FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 40–74 (describing a number of
examples in which patent holders bargain with other parties to determine the
boundaries of their rights post-grant).
34
See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 3, at 3 (describing “mass aggregators” of
patents); Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by
31
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cannot consider only whether a party directly asserts patents. In other
words, parties who do not assert patents against manufacturers, but make
money by transferring patents to others who assert the patents against
manufacturers, may create the same market distortions as those who
simply assert the patents directly.
In a recent work, Ewing and Feldman describe changes in the
modern patent field as having created a market for patent monetization.35
We believe that the term “patent monetization” captures the behavior that
many of the terms and categories above try to articulate. In essence, the
term should capture various formations in which patent rights are
separated from any product that would reflect the rights, and are sold,
traded, grouped, regrouped, licensed, or repurposed, all for generating an
income stream from the rights themselves. In all such efforts to monetize
patent rights, the patent holder’s behavior is distinct from the behavior
involved in creating products and services based on the innovation
covered by the patent.
Many entities engage in a combination of activities. Companies
that everyone would agree are in the business of producing products may
also generate revenue by licensing some of their technology to others.
For example, evidence in the highly publicized lawsuit between Apple
and Samsung over their smartphone and tablet technologies demonstrates
that both parties granted licenses to others at times for the use of their
technology.36 This may occur as a result of an industry-wide effort to
establish standards, a friendly cross-licensing deal, a litigation cease-fire,
or simply an effort to generate additional revenue. Nevertheless, the
primary activities of Apple and Samsung remain product creation.
Corporations and Investors, 4 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 1, (2012) (describing
the emergence of privateering behavior in modern patent markets, in which a
sponsor induces a third party to assert patent rights in a way that benefits the
sponsor without exposing the sponsor to cost and risk).
35
See generally Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4 (describing the emergence of a
market for patent monetization and its potential positive and negative effects);
see also Feldman, supra note 3, at 17–20 (describing and defining intellectual
property monetization).
36
Dan Levine & Edwin Chan, Apple Expert Shines Light on Samsung Sales in
U.S., REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2012, 6:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/08/13/us-apple-samsung-idUSBRE87C0SC20120813 (noting that
Apple licensed design patents to Microsoft and reached out to Samsung hoping
to license its patents to Samsung as well); Charles Arthur & George Sandeman,
Apple-Samsung Patent Trial: A Guide to the Key Issues, THE GUARDIAN (Aug.
23, 2012, 5:20 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/aug/22/applesamsung-patent-dispute (noting that Intel licensed patents from Samsung).
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In the modern patent market, however, one sees the emergence
of numerous entities whose core activity is creation of an income stream
from the patent market itself. These entities are developing in new and
unusual ways—a reminder that any term describing such entities must be
sufficiently flexible and broad.
For example, if a computer manufacturer were to spin part of its
patent portfolio off into a separate entity—one that is charged with
developing licensing for those rights—the spin-off should be classified
as a patent monetization entity. The manufacturer itself, of course, would
remain an entity whose primary activity involves the creation of
products.
In short, although no linguistic representation can be perfect, we
believe that the term “patent monetization entity” best captures the
phenomenon developing in the modern patent market. We also use the
word “monetizer” as a short form, or as a form more appropriate for
individuals. The short form has the added virtue of clarity, as opposed to
the confusing jumble of letters that seems to plague these discussions,
such as PAE and NPE.
For the opposite designation, we chose to keep the term
“operating company” to indicate an entity that uses its patented
inventions to provide a product or service. The term has its own flaws.
For example, there are numerous patent monetization entities that are
“operating” in the plain sense of the word. Consider Acacia, a patent
aggregator with a market capitalization of $1.42 billion, whose shares are
publicly traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange.37 It seems to be
“operating” just fine.
Despite this problem, the term “operating company” has become
the generally used short form for companies utilizing their patents to
provide products or services. We must confess that we have nothing
better to suggest at the moment.
Finally, we chose to track universities as their own category,
separate from patent monetization entities. Although universities do not
manufacture products, their core activity involves education and
academic research, rather than monetization of rights. As a result, we

37

Investment Profile, ACACIA RESEARCH CORPORATION, (Sept. 2012), available
at http://acaciatechnologies.com/docs/AcaciaFactSheet2ndqtr2012.pdf.
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classify them separately and suggest that more research would be helpful
in understanding their role in patent markets.
With the various terms defined as above, we classified the cases
according to one of the following nine categories:
•

Operating Company: An entity was classified as an
operating company if the company was described as
such on the entity’s website or in verifiable
documents such as court filings and SEC filings.
Entities also were classified as operating companies
if they described their main source of revenue as
selling a product or providing a service unrelated to
patent monetization.

•

Patent Monetization Entity: An entity was classified
as a patent monetization entity if the company was
described as such on the entity’s website or in
verifiable documents such as court filings and SEC
filings. Entities also were classified as patent
monetization entities if they described their main
source of revenue as patent litigation or licensing, or
if they were a subsidiary of a known patentmonetization entity such as Acacia.

•

Suspected Operating Company: This category was
used when evidence existed that the entity fit into
the operating company category, but that evidence
was not verifiable. For example, an entity described
by a publication like Bloomberg BusinessWeek as
selling a product would be categorized as a
suspected operating company.
As a specific
example, we coded FFP LLC as a suspected
operating company based on a statement in
Bloomberg BusinessWeek indicating that FFP is
“doing business as Matrix Health Group, operates as
a specialty pharmacy that provides medications and
supplies to children and women with hemophilia,
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von willebrand, and other bleeding disorders in the
United States.”38

38

•

Suspected Patent Monetization Entity: We used this
category when there was evidence to assign an entity
to the patent monetization category, but that
evidence was not verifiable. For example, an entity
with no known operating activities and that a patent
law blog describes as a “patent troll,” would be
categorized as a suspected patent monetization
entity. For example, we coded Purple Leaf LLC
based on two articles calling Purple Leaf a “patent
troll.”39

•

Linked to Operating Company: We used this
category for entities known to be related to operating
companies (e.g. subsidiaries of major corporations),
but for which we could not determine a specific role
within the corporation. We did not designate a
category for “linked to patent monetization entities,”
because the only patent monetization subsidiaries we
found were easily classified as patent monetization
entities themselves.

•

Individual or Trust: This category consisted of
individuals or entities organized as a trust. Based on
the results from our sample, individuals and trusts
appear to function more like monetizers than
operating companies. For example, the Sorensen
Research and Development Trust Fund filed more
patent infringement cases than any other entity in
our sample. Although it is a trust rather than a
corporation, Sorensen appears to make most of its
money through patent monetization. Similarly, many

Company Overview of FFP, LLC, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK,
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapI
d=6657799 (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
39
Abe Sauer, NPR Exposes Patent-Trolling, But Will Reforms Result?, BRAND
CHANNEL (July 28, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.brandchannel.com/home/po
st/2011/07/28/NPR-Exposes-Patent-Trolling-But-will-Reforms-Result.aspx;
Leena Rao, Patent Troll Sues Amazon Over Electronic Checkout Service,
TECHCRUNCH (July 26, 2011) http://techcrunch.com/2011/07/26/patent-trollsues-amazon-over-electronic-checkout-service/.
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of the individuals in our sample appeared to be
inventors who had tried to operate companies and,
when this failed, switched to litigation as a way of
monetizing their patents.
•

University: We used a separate code because
universities appear fundamentally different from
either operating companies or monetization entities.
Given that only one of our first named plaintiffs was
a university, more research is needed to determine
whether there are any patterns in how universities
litigate patent cases, or in how they behave short of
litigation.

•

Other: If an entity did not fit into any of the above
categories, it was classified as “Other.” These
included entities with mixed patent monetization and
operating company activities (e.g. operating two
subsidiaries, one that focuses on selling a product
and another that focuses exclusively on monetizing
patents other than those related to the product). This
category applied in only 8 of the 500 cases.

•

Insufficient Evidence: If there was absolutely no
information about an entity, we classified it as
insufficient evidence. In the end, we were able to
classify 99% of our cases, leaving only seven with
insufficient evidence.

B. Case Outcomes
We categorized the outcomes of our sample set in one the
following groups:
•

A Likely Settlement: We categorized cases as likely
to have been settlements if the case was dismissed at
the parties' request pursuant to Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This includes
cases in which the party who claimed patent
infringement voluntarily dismissed the case before
the defendant filed an answer. It also includes
stipulated dismissals, in which both parties agree
that the judge should dismiss the complaint without
entering a judgment of fault, often because they have
entered into a confidential settlement agreement.
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We excluded cases in which there was a
determinative outcome in the case prior to a
settlement. For example, we excluded cases in which
there had been a trial verdict prior to settlement or in
which prior to settlement, there had been a summary
judgment finding that the defendant had not
infringed the patent. We also excluded cases that
were dismissed for procedural reasons, such as cases
dismissed under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which covers defenses such as the
lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

40

•

A Procedural Disposition: This category included
cases dismissed for procedural reasons, such as those
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which covers defenses such as
the lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

•

The Claimant Wins: This category denotes cases in
which the party filing the infringement claim has
won, including consent judgments in favor of the
party filing the claim. In a consent judgment, the
judge enters a decision in favor of one party or the
other that is binding on both parties, with the
consent of both parties. For example, the parties may
choose to consent to a particular decision after claim
construction if the judge’s construction essentially
destroys one side’s case. When a party sees that a
loss is likely given the judge’s construction of the
claim, it may be in that party’s interest to move
straight to a final judgment, which then can be
appealed to the Federal Circuit. (An appeal to the
Federal Circuit cannot take place until the trial court
has entered a final judgment.)40

•

Claimant Loses: This category denotes cases in
which the party defending against the claim of
infringement has won, including consent judgments
in favor of the defendant. As described above, in a

See generally James E. Pfander and David R. Pekarek Krohn, Interlocutory
Review by Agreement of the Parties: A Preliminary Analysis, 105 NW. U. L. R.
1043 (2011) (providing a general discussion of Federal Circuit jurisdiction over
final judgments).
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consent judgment, the judge enters a decision in
favor of one party or the other that is binding on
both parties, but with the consent of both parties.
•

Ongoing Cases: This category consists of cases that
are continuing as of the time of the study, including
cases that have been stayed.

•

Cases Transferred, Severed, or Consolidated: This
category denotes cases that were transferred out of
the district in which they were originally filed, as
well as cases severed or consolidated. For all of
these cases, we also categorized the final outcome of
the case after transfer, severance or consolidation.
We avoided double counting by excluding cases if
they appeared in our sample as the result of a
transfer, rather than an initial filing.

C. Limitations
We note that the GAO requested a sample size of only 100 cases
a year and a total of 500 cases across five years. While the GAO’s
statistician determined that such a sample size would be representative,
with an error rate of 9 percent, the sample remains much smaller than we
would ideally prefer. Thus, we temper our results with the caution
appropriate for the sample size. Other limitations exist, such as the
exclusion of cases for which the electronically available information is
insufficient.
We also note that our study did not include cases filed as
declaratory judgments. Declaratory judgment cases arise when a party,
threatened with a claim of patent infringement, files an anticipatory suit
to challenge the validity of the patent with which it is threatened. Our
study focused on plaintiffs claiming that their patents have been
infringed, and declaratory judgment plaintiffs do not allege patent
infringement.
This leads to what we consider the greatest limitation in a study
of this kind—focusing on lawsuits that are actually filed likely misses
much of the action in patent monetization. Based on anecdotal
evidence—albeit a mountain of such anecdotes—a vast amount of
monetization activity never progresses to the point at which the patent

No. 2]

THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT 500

375

holder actually files an infringement lawsuit.41 Given the costs of
litigating infringement suits, the uncertainty of the outcome, and the
potential for outsized judgment awards, companies frequently capitulate
to a patent monetizer’s demands, rather than face the ordeal of a trial.42
Thus, a study that focuses only on lawsuits filed misses much of the
dance.43
Another limitation results from focusing mainly on entities filing
lawsuits, rather than focusing on defendants in the lawsuits. As a result
of this approach, our case outcome is based on the last recorded outcome
in the case, and does not account for different outcomes obtained by
different defendants. Where there were multiple defendants and one
defendant settled while another went to trial, the case is likely to be
coded as a trial outcome, rather than a settlement. Thus, the number of
settlements may be slightly understated in the results.

III. THE AIA 500: RESULTS
As described above, we analyzed a random sample of 100 of the
patent cases filed each year from 2007 through 2011, for a total of 500
cases. The data show a strong increase in the number of cases filed by
patent monetizers across this period. Although there are a variety of ways

41

See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 50–74 (describing bargaining outside lawsuits
in the modern patent system to resolve uncertainties surrounding the boundaries
of patent rights); Ewing & Feldman, supra note 3, at 23–25 (describing why it is
economically rational for manufacturing companies to capitulate to a
monetizer’s demands rather than to fight, even if the patents underlying the
demands are weak). See also id. at 15, 60, 70 (describing the mass aggregator
Intellectual Ventures, which has earned $2 billion in licensing revenue since its
inception in 2000 but did not file any lawsuits until 2010; the entity does appear
in some cases to have transferred patents to third parties, who then filed
lawsuits).
42
See Feldman, supra note 2, at 11 (describing the way in which the combined
effects of 1) the uncertainty surrounding the boundary of patent rights, 2) the
lack of a quick and inexpensive way to resolve such uncertainty, and 3) the
possibility of facing outsized damage awards and injunction against entire
products, patent holders are able to bargain for returns well beyond the value of
their patents).
43
Cf. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 56–65 (explaining the “dance of the
sugarplum letter,” in which patent holders try to signal their intent to enforce
their patent rights against someone without triggering enough of an actual case
or controversy that the target can file a lawsuit to declare the patent holder’s
patent invalid).
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one could group the categories that we identified to reach final results, all
of the approaches demonstrate a strong increase.
In particular, our data classified those who filed a patent
infringement lawsuit into one of 9 categories. The rise in lawsuits filed
by patent monetizers is evident, even with this highly stratified grouping.
Looking at the data with all 9 categories graphed separately, the red line
for cases filed by patent monetization entities rises while the blue line for
cases filed by operating companies drops off sharply.

In fact, patent monetization entities filed only 14 percent of the cases in
2007, the first year of our sample. Three years later, patent monetization
entities filed 22 percent of the patent infringement lawsuits, ending the
survey the following year having filed 20 percent of the examined
lawsuits.
In order to properly understand the data, however, it is best to
aggregate some of the categories. For example, we set an extremely high
bar for classifying entities as either operating companies or patent
monetization entities by requiring either an entity’s self-classification or
a statement in a verifiable court record. However, even with those
classified as suspected patent monetization entities or suspected
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operating companies, we still found ample secondary evidence of their
proper categorization.44 As a result, we believe that operating companies
and patent monetization entities should be aggregated with their
suspected counterparts.
In addition, our study suggests that individuals and trusts
frequently behave like patent monetizers.45 This should come as no
surprise. Modern patent trolling began with small entities and individuals
asserting patents against larger companies that provide products or
services.46 In short, parties that we designated as confirmed patent
monetization entities are cut from the same cloth as individuals or trusts
asserting patent rights, and we concluded that they should be grouped
together for this analysis.
In short, we believe that the most appropriate grouping would be
to combine confirmed patent monetization entities with suspected
monetization entities and individuals/trusts. Looking at this group, the
number of lawsuits filed by monetizers as a whole increases greatly, both
in absolute terms and as a percentage of all patent infringement cases.
Specifically, lawsuits filed by monetizers rose from 22 percent in 2007 to
almost 40 percent in 2011. This is a remarkably high level, and it offers
an indication of the extent of monetization activity in the litigation
system. The graph below demonstrates the data aggregating the three
monetizer categories in percentage terms. In addition, Appendix A
contains a chart that provides the year-by-year numbers.
44

See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A (describing the behavior of individuals and trusts in the
sample).
46
See Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and
Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1595–96 (2009) (discussing
George Selden’s turn of the twentieth century suit against automobile
manufacturers and Genetics Institute’s 1980s suit against Amgen); See also
Jeffrey D. Sullivan, Vanquishing the Patent Trolls, NEWSXCHANGE, 6
(April/May 2005) http:// www.bakerbotts.com/files/Publication/46c75843-697645d4-982f-2e4f4c217a03/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8c0532c0-b1b04b7b-bd1b-36683a5ecd90/LESBI%20April%202005.pdf (observing that “a
cottage industry has sprung up wherein opportunistic individuals form holding
companies for the principal purpose of acquiring, and asserting, broadly (if
vaguely) worded patents against entire industries, with the goal of extracting
license fees from multiple defendants”); Donald D. Chisum, Reforming Patent
Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 340 (2005) (noting
recent concerns with patent trolls, defined as individuals, small companies or
investment groups who obtain patents and do not produce anything using the
patent).
45
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In understanding the data, however, we wanted to make certain
that the changes in the joinder rules were not distorting our results. As
mentioned above, the recently passed America Invents Act changed the
joinder rules to make it more difficult for those filing patent lawsuits to
include multiple defendants in the same suit and in the patent filer’s
preferred jurisdiction.47 The change was aimed particularly at monetizers
who had been frequenting the Eastern District of Texas, among others,
with lawsuits involving multiple defendants.48
Prior to the passage of the America Invents Act, many courts
would not allow patent holders to join infringers in a single case if the
only common fact or transaction among the defendants was that the
defendants were all alleged to have infringed the same patent.49
However, a small number of courts, most notably the Eastern District of
47

America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2011).
See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
49
See Rudd v. Lux Prods. Corp., No. 09-cv-6957, 2011 WL 148052, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 12, 2011) (noting that numerous states have adopted the approach that
“a party fails to satisfy Rule 20(a)’s requirement of a common transaction or
occurrence where unrelated defendants, based on different acts, are alleged to
have infringed the same patent.”).
48
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Texas,50 had ruled that the question of a particular patent’s scope was
sufficient to join the parties together in one lawsuit.51 As a result, by
filing suit in the Eastern District of Texas, patent holders could bring suit
against each alleged patent infringer in one action. Patent holders
responded to the ruling by suing as many as 20, 30, or 40 patent holders
in a single swoop.52 The rule allowed monetizers to reduce their litigation
costs and made it more difficult to transfer the case to a forum
convenient for a particular defendant.53 The rulings also enabled
monetizers to file and keep their cases in the Eastern District of Texas,
whose particular procedural rules for patent cases and generous juries
had created an environment hospitable to patent monetizers.54
The America Invents Act resolved this split in the case law by
establishing that, with the exception of cases related to encouraging the
creation of generic pharmaceuticals under the Hatch-Waxman Act,
joinder is proper only if the alleged infringement arose out of the same
occurrence or transaction and involves questions of common fact that
will arise in the action.55 In articulating these requirements, Congress
specifically rejected the interpretation of the Eastern District of Texas.56
50

H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 55 n.61 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67,
85 n.61 (citing Better Educ. Inc. v. Einstruction Corp., No. 2-08-cv-446-TJWCE, 2010 WL 918307 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2010); Mannatech, Inc. v. Country
Life, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-533-O, 2010 WL 2944574 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2010);
Alford Safety Servs., Inc., v. Hot-Hed, Inc., No. 10-1319, 2010 WL 3418233
(E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2010); Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 2010 WL
3835762, (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2010); Adrain v. Genetec Inc., No. 2:08-CV-423,
2009 WL3063414 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2009); Sprint Commc’ns Co. v.
Theglobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615 (D. Kan. 2006); Mymail, Ltd. v. Am.
Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Tex. 2004)).
51
See e.g., Mymail, 223 F.R.D. at 456–57 (holding that alleging infringement of
the same patent was sufficient to join the defendants under Rule 20(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
52
See supra note 10.
53
Bryant, supra note 12, at 688–689.
54
Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in Patent
Litigation and Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 29, 43 (2010) (discussing the Eastern District of Texas’s attractiveness as a
forum for patent suits due to the adoption of rules that “included accelerated
timelines, broader discovery requirements, and severe sanctions for noncompliance”).
55
See America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 299(b) (2011) (“accused infringers may
not be joined in one action as defendants or counterclaim defendants, or have
their actions consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations that they each
have infringed the patent or patents in suit”).
56
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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As a result, for cases filed after the Act became law on Sept. 16, 2011,
infringement suits could become more difficult and expensive for patent
monetization entities.57
Although the America Invents Act, in theory, should make it
more difficult to file infringement suits, anecdotal evidence suggests that
the new joinder rules have not yielded the intended results. Some
practitioners have suggested that patent monetization entities are getting
around the new joinder rules by filing a series of separate cases against
different parties and then moving to consolidate the cases.
We wanted to ensure that changes in the joinder rules were not
distorting our data. If monetizers could not join as many defendants
together in a single lawsuit, one could speculate that the number of
lawsuits might rise simply because monetizers were now suing each
defendant in a different lawsuit. For example, before the new joinder
rules, a patent holder could file one lawsuit against 40 companies.
Afterwards, the patent holder might need to file 40 separate lawsuits.
Thus, if only lawsuits are counted, then there is the potential to
misattribute the cause for the upward trend.
We compensated for this possible effect by counting the number
of patent assertions, that is, the number of defendants sued. Our data
show that the number of defendants sued by patent monetization entities
has also increased. This suggests that the rise in suits filed during 2011
did not result from the new joinder rules. We also note that the 2011
increases in both the number of cases and defendants followed the
general trend of increases across the 5 years.58

57

Carl Charneski, Impact of the AIA on Patent Litigation: Changes That May
Affect Your Choice of Forum, 4 LANDSLIDE (May/June 2012), available at
http://www.brinkshofer.com/files/article_landslide_mayjune_2012_charneski.pd
f.
58
We note that the data show a drop in the number of patent defendants sued in
2010, due to a decrease in the number of suits filed by individuals and trusts.
The transitory drop may be due to the small size of our sample, or to other
causes that we have not identified.
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Overall Number of Defendants in Lawsuits Filed, By Plaintiff
Entity and Year

Some anecdotal evidence also suggests that monetization entities
may have rushed to file infringement cases before the America Invents
Act was signed into law. This could have had the effect of temporarily
increasing the number of monetization lawsuits in the months leading up
to passage of the Act and decreasing the number of monetization
lawsuits afterwards. Any such activity, most likely, would have focused
on filings to avoid the changes in joinder rules, an issue we addressed as
described above. It is possible, however, that other anticipatory filing
could have occurred, followed by a subsequent drop. Our data was not
sufficiently grained to detect a rise occurring in the months before the
Act came into effect in September of 2011 followed by a drop in the
succeeding months. Rather, our analysis covers the aggregate effects
across the year. It would be interesting to examine whether such an intrayear rise and drop occurred, as well as whether any effects lingered into
2012. We note again, however, that the 2011 increases, both in number
of cases and in number of defendants, followed the general trend of
increases across the 5 years for both numbers.

A. Top Lawsuit Filers
The data also show an interesting result when grouped according
to how many infringement cases a particular patent holder filed in the
five years covered by the sample. Looking at the data in this manner
provides a view of which entities, and which types of entities, seem to be
litigating most often. The data show that out of the five most litigious
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patent holders in the sample, four are patent monetizers,59 and only one is
an operating company.60
Most Frequent Filers in Sample, By Number of Lawsuits Filed

In contrast, universities were almost invisible in this dataset.
Universities accounted for only 0.2% of the first-named plaintiffs who
filed lawsuits in our sample. The number rises slightly when secondnamed plaintiffs are included, but remains quite small.61
59

Although Sorensen Research and Development Trust (SRDT) fund is listed as
an “individual or trust” for purposes of transparency, SRDT’s litigation behavior
is closer to that of a monetizer than that of an operating company, and several
external sources characterize SRDT as a monetizer. See, e.g., Renee L. Jackson,
Paul B. Klaas, Peter M. Lancaster & J. Thomas Vitt, Patent Trolls: How To
Avoid
Being
Gobbled
Up,
DORSEY
&
WHITNEY
LLP,
http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/MP_CCS2010_Complete_Patent_Trolls.pd
f (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) (listing SRDT as one of the “Kings of Troll
Litigation”); Scott A. McKeown, Notorious Troll Patents Reconsidered By
USPTO,
PATENTS
POST-GRANT
(Mar.
29,
2011),
http://www.patentspostgrant.com/lang/en/2011/03/notorious-troll-patentsreconsidered (characterizing SRDT as an “infamous troll”); Peter Zura, Who
Cares About Health Care Reform? Parent Reform is Back!, THE 271 PATENT
BLOG (Feb. 25, 2010) http://271patent.blogspot.com/2010_02_01_archive.html
(noting that SRDT is listed as one of the most litigious non-practicing entities).
60
Some patent monetization entities may be undercounted in this set. For
example, the largest known patent aggregator, Intellectual Ventures, holds its
patents in the form of more than 1,300 shell companies. See Ewing & Feldman,
supra note 4, at 7. Our methodology would not have recognized any connection
between these shell companies, and thus would not have calculated the number
of lawsuits that the entity as a whole may have filed.
61
Universities account for about 5% of all second named plaintiffs, but even
including this number, universities comprise less than 1% of all plaintiffs.
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B. States of Filing and States of Incorporation
We also looked at the data to see where patent holders were
incorporated and where they chose to file their lawsuits. The following
two maps show the entities’ states of incorporation and states of filing.
Blue circles indicate operating companies, and red circles indicate patent
monetizers.
Entity States of Incorporation

Entity States of Filing

We designed the visual to help differentiate between clusters that
represent factors common to all patent holders—both operating
companies and monetizers—and clusters that represent factors specific to
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monetizers. Thus, where the charts show red dots surrounded by larger
rings of blue, one can assume that the parties are drawn to the area for
reasons that apply to all patent holders. For example, both maps show a
cluster of cases in Delaware. We see the red ring for monetizers
surrounded by a larger ring of blue for operating companies. One could
speculate that entities choose to incorporate in Delaware, for example,
for its well-developed corporate law and not for any reason particular to
patent monetization. On the States of Filing map, New York and
California also show red dots surrounded by blue rings. These could
reflect the sheer number of entities located in California and New
York—particularly technology companies, who are more easily
embroiled in patent litigation.62
The more interesting results on the map show up as large red
dots not surrounded by a ring of blue. These indicate locations that have
drawn patent monetizers but have not drawn patent litigants as a whole.
Looking at the States of Filing map, it is not surprising to see a giant red
dot over Texas, given that state’s reputation as hospitable to patent
lawsuits in general and to monetization lawsuits in particular. Large red
dots also appear in other places, such as Florida, Illinois, and Indiana,
indicating states where many patent lawsuits are filed. On the States of
Filing map, red dots appear in Texas, Florida, and Virginia, indicating
where many patent litigants are incorporated.
We consider our data to be insufficient to draw any conclusions
at this juncture, because the sample size is small and the causal factors
behind state selection are complex and interwoven. Nevertheless, the
maps may suggest tantalizing possibilities. Perhaps patent monetizers
prefer areas that have local rules related to patent litigation or even a
generally experienced bench. That might explain part of the attraction of
Illinois, with its key area of Chicago. Perhaps states are selected due to
relationships with or the expertise of local counsel. What about Florida
and Indiana? Are there characteristics of these locations, including those

62

Compare PATENT FREEDOM, Exposure by Industry, https://www.paten
tfreedom.com/about-npes/industry/ (last visited July 13, 2012) (demonstrating
with data captured as of July 13, 2012 that more than 50% of non-practicing
entity lawsuits are in the hardware, software, semiconducter, communications,
and consumer electronics industries), with U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
886. Patents, by Industry, ALLCOUNTRIES.ORG http://www.allcountries.
org/uscensus/886_patents_by_industry.html (showing that patents for electronic
and other electronic equipment were approximately 21.8% of the patents issued
between 1980 and 1998).
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related to judicial fora that patent monetizers view as favorable, or are
the data simply anomalous?

C. Case Outcomes
Finally, we examined the outcomes of the cases filed in the fiveyear sample. At the outset, we note that the vast majority of cases settle.
This is true regardless of whether the infringement suit was filed by an
operating company or by a patent monetizer. As the chart shows, more
than three-fifths of all cases in our sample appear to have settled.

Looking at the timing of the settlements, the data suggest that
patent monetizers rarely proceed to trial, or even to a summary judgment
decision. When they do proceed to the summary judgment stage,
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monetizers win even more rarely. Our sample also shows a few more
operating companies proceeding to trial or summary judgment. We
caution, however, that the number of such cases in the sample is so small
that one cannot safely draw a conclusion.

In addition, we note that the operating companies in our sample
were slightly less likely to settle and slightly more likely to end the case
with a win in some fashion. Again, we caution that the number of cases
in which operating companies proceeded to trial or a win is so small and
the differences between settlement rates for operating companies and
monetizers in our sample are so slight that one cannot draw meaningful
conclusions.
With the same sample size caveat in mind, we note that the
category composed of individuals and trusts has a much higher
procedural dismissal rate, as well as a slightly higher rate of loss by
default judgments. It is possible that individuals and trusts are not as
adept at navigating the legal system as corporations or larger monetizers,
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which could lead to greater procedural failures. We also note that
individuals and trusts continue to trial more often than others. Although
the data permits no more than speculation, possible explanations could
include that individuals and trusts have a greater emotional investment in
the case or that operating companies do not consider individuals to be
much of a threat and therefore are reluctant to settle. These issues would
benefit from further data and exploration.
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CONCLUSION
For some time, courts and commentators have grappled with the
question of whether patent monetization entities are having an effect on
modern patent litigation. We have attempted to help answer this
question.
A random sample of 500 cases from 2007 to 2011 suggests that
the impact of patent monetization entities on patent litigation is both
dramatic and growing over time. We note in particular that lawsuits filed
by patent monetizers have increased from 22 percent of the cases filed to
almost 40 percent of the cases filed, and that the increase has occurred in
only five years.
We also note that of the five litigants who filed the most patent
infringement claims in the period covered by the data, four were
monetizers and only one was an operating company. On the opposite end
of the spectrum, universities barely registered on the scale, filing only 0.2
percent of the lawsuits in our sample.
Finally, the data also show that cases filed by patent
monetization entities were unlikely to advance very far in the trial
process and generally settled early in the litigation. The number of cases
of any type proceeding to final disposition is small, however, making
reliable conclusions impossible to draw.
We hope the data will not only help to answer Congress’s initial
question concerning the impact of non-practicing entities on patent
litigation, but also will spur legislators to look for ways to address the
impact that patent monetization entities are having on the United States
patent litigation system, as well as on the economy as a whole.
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